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I. INTRODUCTION
Small energy companies using hydraulic fracturing, along with hori-
zontal drilling, are unlocking vast oil and natural gas deposits trapped
in shale all over the United States.  Over the past few years, several
key technical, economic, and energy policy developments have
spurred increased use of hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas extraction
over a wider diversity of geographic regions and geologic formations.2
However, with the expansion of hydraulic fracturing, there have been
increasing concerns voiced by the public about potential impacts on
drinking water resources, public health, and the environment.3
Due to these public concerns, oil and gas companies and service
providers have experienced a significant increase in recent litigation.
For instance, there have been at least fifty recent lawsuits filed in Ar-
kansas,4 California,5 Colorado,6 Louisiana,7 New York,8 Ohio,9 Penn-
sylvania,10 Texas,11 and West Virginia that relate to or stem from
2.  See Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
hydraulicfracture/ (last accessed May 20, 2013).
3. Id.
4. Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs., LLC, No. 4:11-CV-0420, 2012 WL 1377052
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2012); Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., Nos. 1:11-CV-0044, 1:11-CV-45-
DPM, 2012 WL 528253 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012); Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum
(Ark.), Inc., 4:11-CV-0474 (E.D. Ark. filed June 9, 2011); Scoggin v. Cudd Pumping
Servs., Inc., No. 4:11-CV-00678-JMM (E.D. Ark. filed Sept. 12, 2011); Bartlett v.
Frontier Gas Servs., LLC, No 4:11-CV-0910 (E.D. Ark. filed Dec. 23, 2011); Hiser v.
XTO Energy, Inc., (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2012).
5. Ctr. for Biology Diversity v. BLM, No. 11-CV-6174 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 8,
2011).
6. Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2011-CV-22 (Denver Co. Dist. Ct. filed
March 23, 2011); Evenson v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2011-CV-5118 (Denver Co. Dist.
Ct. filed July 20, 2011).
7. Andre v. EXCO Res., Inc., No. 5:11-00610 (W.D. La. filed Apr. 15, 2011);
Beckman v. EXCO Res., Inc., No. 5:11-00617 (W.D. La. filed Apr. 18, 2011); Teekell
v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 12-0044, 2012 WL 2049922 (W.D. La. June 6,
2012).
8. Maring v. Nalbone, No. K12009001499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Chautauqua Co. filed
Aug. 27, 2009); Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp., 6:11-CV-06119 (W.D.N.Y. filed
Mar. 9, 2011); State v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 896 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2012);
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180
(E.D.N.Y. 2012); Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post, No. 2012-0810CV (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Steuben Co. filed June 25, 2012).
9. Mangan v. Landmark 4, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00613, 2013 WL 950560 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 11, 2013); Boggs v. Landmark 4, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00614, 2013 WL
944776 (N.D. Ohio March 11, 2013); Koonce v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, No.
4:12-CV-0736 (N.D. Ohio filed Mar. 27, 2012).
10. Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010);
Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Armstrong v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 10-CV-000680 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. filed Oct. 27,
2010); Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, LLC, No. 4:11-CV-01425-MCC, 2012
WL 1463594 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2012); Zimmerman v. Atlas Am., LLC, No. 2009-
7564 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. filed Sept. 21, 2009); Dillon v. Antero Res., 2:11-CV-1038, 2012
WL 2899710 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2012); Becka v. Antero Res., No. 2:11-CV-01040, 2012
WL 2899710 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2012); Otis v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:11-
CV-00115, 2012 WL 1657930 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2012); Brockway Borough Mun.
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hydraulic fracturing operations.12 Most of the cases involve private
landowners asserting tort-related claims against the oil and gas indus-
try.  However, there have also been lawsuits brought by citizen groups
under various federal environmental statutes as well as litigation on
whether a municipality can ban hydraulic fracturing within its city lim-
its.13  Nonetheless, due to the breadth of current litigation, the scope
of this paper has been limited to the typical claims and key defenses
that have been asserted in cases between private landowners and oil
and gas companies concerning alleged environmental
contamination.14
Auth. v. Flatirons Dev., LLC, 2010 WL 5769162 (Pa. Com. Pl. filed Dec. 15, 2010)
(No. 1141-2010); Bidlack v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 10-EQ-000761, 2012
WL 1657934 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2012); Burnett v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 11-
CV-80 (Ct. Common Pleas, Bradford Cty., Pa. Feb. 25, 2011), removed, No.
3:11–CV–1059 (M.D. Pa., June 1, 2011), remanded to state court (Aug. 31, 2011);
Phillips v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:11-MC-00126 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25,
2011); Manning v. WPX Energy Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00646 (M.D. Pa. filed Apr. 9,
2012); Haney v. Range Res., No. 2012-3534 (Ct. Common Pleas, Washington Cty., Pa.
filed May 25, 2012); Butts v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 3:12-CV-01330 (M.D. Pa. filed
July 10, 2012).
11. Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 3:10-CV-1385-N (N.D. Tex. filed July
15, 2010); Ruggiero v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. 10-10-801 (Dist. Ct., Wise Cnty.,
Tex. filed Oct. 18, 2010); Sizelove v. Williams Prod. Co., No. 2010-50355-367 (431st
Dist. Ct., Denton Cnty., Tex. filed Nov. 3, 2010); Heinkel-Wolfe v. Williams Prod. Co.,
No. 2010-40355-362 (362nd Dist. Ct., Denton Cnty., Tex. filed Nov. 3, 2010); Mitchell
v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 3:10-CV-02555-N (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 15,
2010); Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CV-00708-MHS-ALM (N.D. Tex.
filed Dec. 15, 2010); Smith v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 11-CV-0196 (N.D. Tex.
filed Jan. 31, 2011); Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp., No. 2011-40097-362 (362nd
Dist. Ct., Denton Cnty., Tex. filed Feb. 28, 2011); Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No.
11-01650-E (Cnty. Ct. at Law No. 5, Dallas, Tex. filed Mar. 8, 2011); Lipsky v. Range
Prod. Co., No. CV-11-0798 (43rd Dist. Ct., Parker Cnty., Tex. filed June 20, 2011);
Knoll v. XTO Energy, Inc, No. 2010-10345-16 (Denton Co. Dist. Ct. filed June 27,
2011) (water claims subsequently dropped); Beck v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 2011-484
(123rd Dist. Ct., Panola Cnty., Tex. filed Dec. 1, 2011); Strong v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
No. 2011-487 (123rd Dist. Ct., Panola Cnty., Tex. filed Dec. 2, 2011).
12. Hagy v. Equitable Prod. Co., No. 2:10-CV-13722, 2012 WL 2562856 (S.D. W.
Va. June 29, 2012); Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:11-CV-5, 2012 WL
5336958 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 25, 2012); Magers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No.
12-C-36H (Cir. Ct., Marshall Cnty., W. Va. filed Feb. 24, 2010), removed, No. 5:12-
CV-49 (N.D. W. Va.); Rine v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:11-0004 (N.D. W.
Va. filed Jan. 1, 2011); Bombardiere, Sr. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 1:11-CV-50
(N.D. W. Va. filed Apr. 14, 2011); Perna v. Reserve Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 11-C-2284
(Cir. Ct., Kanawha Cnty., W. Va. filed Dec. 21, 2011).
13. See, e.g., Barclay R. Nicholson & Stephen C. Dillard, Fulbright & Jaworski
L.L.P., Analysis of Litigation Involving Shale and Hydraulic Fracturing (Nov. 2012),
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/20121120AnalysisofLitigationInvolving-
Shale1.pdf; Dae Neslin, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, Hydraulic Fracturing Litiga-
tion: Recent Developments and Current Issues in Cases Involving Alleged Water
Supply Impacts (Sept. 2012), http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/Neslin-RM-
MLI-Hydraulic-Fracturing%20Litigation.pdf; Hydraulic Fracturing, ARNOLD &
PORTER, LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Hydraulic%20
Fracturing%20Case%20Chart.pdf (summarizing different types of lawsuits).
14. Due to the long history of oil and gas development in Texas, its jurisprudence
is the most developed and is often relied upon by courts from other jurisdictions.
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II. TYPICAL CLAIMS
Although the facts of each case differ, they often share striking sim-
ilarities.  For the most part, the plaintiffs either own the surface estate
or live on neighboring properties where recent oil and gas operations
have occurred.15  The defendant is the oil and gas operator or service
provider that assisted in drilling and completing the well, and/or a
midstream company that owns or operates a nearby compressor sta-
tion and related equipment.  Most cases are asserted on behalf of
plaintiffs individually.  However, at least five cases have been asserted
as class actions.16  In this regard, one court denied class certification,
finding that the individual issues presented predominated over the
common issues.17  Another court determined that the defendants’ mo-
tion to deny class certification was premature.18  The plaintiffs’ com-
plaints typically arise from alleged impacts to groundwater and/or air
as a result of recent oil and gas drilling operations.  However, in one
case the plaintiff also claimed that the defendants’ subsequent injec-
tion well operations led to earthquakes.19  Although claims concern-
ing air impacts are on the rise, to date, most of the litigation concerns
alleged groundwater impacts.
A. Groundwater
With respect to the groundwater claims, the plaintiffs typically re-
side in rural areas and rely on water wells on their property as their
primary source of drinking water.  Invariably, the plaintiffs claim that
soon after the defendant commenced drilling and hydraulic fracturing
operations, the plaintiffs’ groundwater became contaminated and
could no longer be used for consumption, bathing, or washing
clothes.20  For example, one plaintiff claimed that, following hydraulic
fracturing activities, its water turned an orange/yellow color, now
Accordingly, as a default, this Article will cite to Texas case law authority and, when
appropriate, authority from relevant other jurisdictions is also referenced herein.
15. However, in Bombardiere v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 2011 WL
2443691 (N.D. W. Va. 2011), a plaintiff employee asserted claims against his employer
for alleged exposure to harmful chemicals while performing hydraulic fracturing
operations.
16. Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs., No. 4:11-CV-00474-JLH (E.D. Ark. May 17,
2011); Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.) Inc., No. 4:11-CV-0474-JLH (E.D.
Ark. June 9, 2011) (four similar class action lawsuits were consolidated into one
proceeding).
17. Order at 12, Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs., No. 4:11-CV-00420-BRW (E.D.
Ark. Apr. 19, 2012) (No. 149).
18. Order at 10, Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No. 1:11-CV-00044-DPM (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 17, 2012) (No. 82).
19. Class Action Compl. at 2–4, Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.) Inc., No.
4:11-CV-0474-JLH (E.D. Ark. June 9, 2011) (No. 3).
20. See, e.g., Pl.’s Original Compl. at 3, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No.
4:10-CV-00708-MHS-ALM (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
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tasted bad, and gave off a foul odor.21  Those same plaintiffs also
claimed that test results indicated that their water was contaminated
with, among other things, harmful petroleum constituents, such as
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and barium.22  In another
lawsuit, the plaintiff claimed that testing results showed water contam-
ination with high levels of metals: aluminum, arsenic, barium, beryl-
lium, calcium, chromium, cobalt, copper, iron, lead, lithium,
magnesium, manganese, nickel, potassium, sodium, strontium, tita-
nium, vanadium, and zinc, some of which are contained in bentonite,
which is used in drilling mud.23  Plaintiffs generally allege that the
groundwater contamination is caused by, among other things, negli-
gence in drilling; construction and operation of the wells, including
poor casing and cementing; as well as, releases, spills, and discharges
of hazardous chemicals and industrial wastes during drilling activities
in general.24
B. Air
With respect to the air contamination claims, the plaintiffs likewise
live near compressor stations, pipelines, and oil and gas drilling opera-
tions.25  In one case, the plaintiffs claimed that a gas compressor sta-
tion was just 990 feet from their home, a gas pipeline just 700 feet
away, and that eight gas drills were within a three-quarter mile ra-
dius.26  The plaintiffs alleged that these operations have lowered their
property value because of the constant racket and toxic formaldehyde,
sulfur dioxide, benzene, toluene, and xylene emissions.27  The plain-
tiffs also claimed to suffer from headaches, respiratory ailments, and
trouble breathing as a result of the defendants’ drilling and com-
pressing operations, which were allegedly polluting the air surround-
ing the plaintiffs’ home.28  In another lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged
that nearby compressor stations caused harmful levels of noise pollu-
tion and emitted large amounts of methane and hydrogen sulfide,
among other flammable and noxious gases.29  Finally, in yet another
lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that injuries were caused from exposure
21. See, e.g., Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at 4, Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
No. 3:10-CV-01385-N, 2010 WL 3706170 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010) (No. 9).
22. Id.; see also, Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at 3, Boggs v. Landmark 4, LLC, No.
1:12-CV-00614-DCN, 2012 WL 7803606 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (No. 1).
23. See, e.g., Pl.’s Original Compl. at 4, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No.
4:10-CV-00708 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
24. See, e.g., Compl. at 1, Hagy v. Equitable Prod. Co., No. 10-CV-01372 (S.D. W.
Va. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 1).
25. See, e.g., Pl.’s Original Pet., Heinkel-Wolfe v. Williams Prod. Co., No. 2010-




29. See, e.g., Compl. at 8, Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs., No 4:11-CV-00420-BRW
(E.D. Ark. May 17, 2011) (No. 1).
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to air contaminated by defendants’ nearby operations with “hazard-
ous gases, chemicals and industrial wastes,” including “hydrogen sul-
fide, hexane, n-heptane, toluene, propane, isobutene, n-butane,
isopentane, n-pentane and other toxic hydrocarbons, combustible
gases, hazardous pollutants, and industrial and/or residual waste.”30
III. TYPICAL CAUSES OF ACTION
The typical causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs are nuisance
(private and public), trespass, negligence, negligence per se, breach of
contract, strict liability for ultra-hazardous and abnormally dangerous
activities, liability under state hazardous sites cleanup acts, and fraud.
Plaintiffs have also asserted claims for negligent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, impairment of use of property, deceptive trade
practice act violations, premises liability, fear of developing dreaded
diseases, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The




Nuisance is the most common cause of action asserted against oil
and gas operators related to hydraulic fracturing operations.  For in-
stance, in Harris v. Devon Energy Production Co., L.P., the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant’s drilling-related activities created a pri-
vate nuisance on the plaintiffs’ property.31  The plaintiffs claimed that
the acts and omissions of the defendant resulted in the contamination
of the groundwater under plaintiffs’ land, which substantially inter-
fered with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their groundwater for
drinking, bathing, and washing.32  They also claimed that the contami-
nated well water offended plaintiffs’ senses and made their enjoyment
of their property uncomfortable and inconvenient.33  In Fiorentino v.
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs claimed that defendants created
and maintained a continuing private nuisance by allowing gas wells to
exist and operate in a dangerous and hazardous condition, allowing
the spills and releases to spread to surrounding areas, including plain-
tiffs’ properties and drinking water supplies, resulting in injuries to
plaintiffs’ health, well-being, and property.34
30. Compl. at 4, Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2011-CV-2218, 2011 WL
1156763 (Denver Co. Dist. Ct. filed Mar. 23, 2011).
31. Pl.’s Original Compl. at 4, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 4:10-
CV-00708 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Compl. at 18, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-02284-JEJ-
MCC (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 1).
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A private nuisance is “a condition that substantially interferes with
the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or
annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use or
enjoy it.”35  “[A] condition that causes aesthetic changes to the view,
scenery, landscape, or beauty of an area is not a nuisance.”36  A nui-
sance may arise by causing physical harm to (1) property, such as “by
the encroachment of a damaging substance or by the property’s de-
struction” or (2) to a person on his property from an assault on his
senses or by other personal injury.  A nuisance may also arise by emo-
tional harm to a person from the deprivation of the enjoyment of his
property through fear, apprehension, or loss of peace of mind.37
“For an actionable nuisance, a defendant must generally engage in
one of three kinds of activity: (1) intentional invasion of another’s in-
terests; (2) negligent invasion of another’s interests; or (3) other con-
duct, culpable because abnormal and out of place in its surroundings,
that invades another’s interests.”38  Accordingly, “proof of negligence
is not essential to the imposition of liability for the creation and main-
tenance of a nuisance.”39  This makes this cause of action very attrac-
tive for plaintiffs as nuisance can have the same practical effect as
strict liability.40  Several courts have held that “one may create a pri-
vate nuisance by using property in a way that causes reasonable fear
in those who own, lease, or occupy property nearby.”41  Generally,
proof of due care is not a defense because nuisance looks only to ef-
fect, not the culpable conduct of the defendant.42
The appropriate measure of damages depends on whether the nui-
sance causing the injury is permanent or temporary.43  The differences
between permanent and temporary injury are discussed in greater de-
tail in Part V.C. below.  Nuisance claims permit injunctive relief and
35. Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003); Walton v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 270 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.), abrogated by
In re Estate of Swanson, 130 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.).
36. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 508 n.3 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2008, pet. denied).
37. Walton, 65 S.W.3d at 270.
38. Z.A.O., Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Ctr. Joint Venture, 50 S.W.3d 531, 543 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.) (quoting Hicks v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 970 S.W.2d
90, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).
39. Bible Baptist Church v. City of Cleburne, 848 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1993, writ denied).
40. Id.
41. Kane v. Cameron Int’l Corp., 331 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Comminge v. Stevenson, 13 S.W. 556, 557 (Tex. 1890));
McMahan v. City of Abilene, 261 S.W. 455, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1924, writ
dism’d w.o.j.).
42. See Hill v. Villarreal, 362 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1962, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
43. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 276 (Tex. 2004).
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recovery for punitive damages.44  Nuisance claims also permit recov-
ery of damages for sickness, annoyance, discomfort, or other substan-
tial bodily harm caused by a nuisance that impairs the comfortable
enjoyment of real property.45
2. Public
In Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum, (Arkansas) Inc., the plaintiffs
asserted a public nuisance claim on the basis that defendants’ conduct
constituted a substantial and unreasonable interference with the rights
common to the general public.46  The plaintiffs claimed that this un-
reasonable interference arose from defendants’ drilling operations
which led to recent seismic activity in Arkansas.47
A public nuisance is a condition that amounts to “an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public.”48  “A public
nuisance is maintained (1) by act, or by failure to perform a legal duty,
(2) intentionally causing or permitting a condition to exist, (3) which
injures or endangers the public health, safety or welfare.”49  A public
nuisance could also arise from the operation of business in a residen-
tial neighborhood.50  Therefore, a public nuisance usually involves an
act or condition that subverts public health or public order or that
constitutes an obstruction of public rights.51  Some courts have held
that if an activity is explicitly licensed or permitted by state law it can-
not be a public nuisance.52  Conversely, as a general rule, a permit
granted by an agency does not act to immunize a permit holder from
private nuisance claims.53
B. Trespass
Trespass is also a very common claim asserted against oil and gas
operators.  With regard to hydraulic fracturing, the claims typically re-
late to alleged subsurface trespass.  For instance, in Scoma v. Chesa-
peake Energy Corp., the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
44. Holubec v. Brandenberger, 214 S.W.3d 650, 655–59 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006,
pet. denied).
45. Vestal v. Gulf Oil Corp., 235 S.W.2d 440, 441–42 (Tex. 1951).
46. Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-CV-0474 (E.D. Ark.
June 9, 2011) (No. 2).
47. Id.
48. Jamail v. Stoneledge Condominium Owners Ass’n, 970 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).
49. Patel v. City of Everman, 179 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied).
50. Ballenger v. City of Grand Saline, 276 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco
1955).
51. Stoughton v. City of Fort Worth, 277 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort
Worth 1955, no writ).
52. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing O’Neil v. State ex rel. Baker, 206 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tenn. 1947);
Fey v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 64 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ten. App. 1933)).
53. FPL Farming v. Envtl. Processing, 351 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2011).
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trespassed upon their land because defendant’s drilling-related activi-
ties resulted in contamination of plaintiffs’ subsurface well water.54
Plaintiff claimed that defendant physically, intentionally, and volunta-
rily caused and permitted petroleum byproducts to cross plaintiffs’
property boundaries, enter into plaintiffs’ land, and contaminate
plaintiffs’ well water.55  In Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), the
plaintiff claimed that through horizontal drilling activities, defendants
entered and invaded plaintiff’s land by drilling bore holes into plain-
tiff’s subsurface property, which contaminated their drinking water.56
The Texas Supreme Court has addressed subsurface trespass in oil
and gas operations on at least three separate occasions.  The first was
Rail Road Commission of Texas v. Manziel, which concerned a permit
granted by the Railroad Commission to inject water to flood a reser-
voir to recover oil.57  In that case, the Manziels sought to set aside and
cancel the permit issued by the Railroad Commission to the Whelans,
who owned land adjoining the Manziel’s tract, arguing that the in-
jected water would constitute a trespass and would result in destruc-
tion of their own well.58  In its holding, the Court specifically stated
that it was “not confronted with the tort aspects” of subsurface in-
jected water migration, nor was it deciding “whether the [Railroad]
Commission’s authorization of such operations throws a protective
cloak around the injecting operator who might otherwise be subjected
to the risks of liability . . . .”59  Instead, the Court held only that Rail-
road Commission authorizations of secondary recovery projects were
not subject to injunctive relief based on trespass claims.60
The second case was the highly publicized opinion of Coastal Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, which involved whether invasions
caused by hydraulic fracturing operations constituted a trespass.61  Al-
though declining to rule on the broad issue of whether such intrusions
constitute a trespass in general, the Court held that the rule of capture
precludes trespass claims that claim drainage of the natural gas as the
only injury.62
The third case was FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing
Systems, L.C., which involved a subsurface trespass claim from a
waste water injection well onto a neighboring property.63  The Beau-
54. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., supra note 21, at 6.
55. Id.
56. Br. for Pl. at 5, Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), No. 3:10-CV-02555, 2010
WL 5384210 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
57. R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1962).
58. Id. at 561, 565.
59. Id. at 566.
60. Id. at 568.
61. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11–12 (Tex.
2008).
62. Id. at 12–13.
63. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011).
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mont Court of Appeals (relying on the Garza opinion) held that a
party was shielded from civil tort liability merely because it received a
permit to operate a deep subsurface wastewater injection well.64  The
court reasoned that “[w]hen a state agency authorized deep subsur-
face injections, no trespass occurs when fluids that were injected at
deep levels are then alleged to have later migrated at those deep
levels into the deep subsurface of nearby tracts.”65  The Supreme
Court disagreed and held that “[a]s a general rule, a permit granted by
an agency does not act to immunize the permit holder from civil tort
liability . . . for actions arising out of the use of the permit.”66  The
Supreme Court also distinguished wastewater injection from hydraulic
fracturing, as the latter deals with the extraction of minerals, and
therefore, the rule of capture would apply, which negates the element
of injury to a trespass claim.67
On remand, the Beaumont Court of Appeals made some interesting
findings.  The court first held that FPL had standing to assert a tres-
pass claim to subsurface water based upon its deeds to tracts to the
surface.68  The court then stated that although the water FPL alleged
that EPS damaged was briny water and not fresh water, the owner of
the surface also owns the saltwater in place beneath the surface.69
EPS suggested that it should have the right to use the storage poten-
tial of the unexploited space below FPL’s tracts, as Texas gave it per-
mits that allowed it to dispose of the waste there.70  In response, the
court stated:
While it is true that FPL has not sought or received a permit to store
non-hazardous waste beneath its property, it presented testimony to
the jury that it never consented to EPS’s use of FPL’s property for
that purpose. And, EPS’s permits merely represent the TCEQ’s
[Texas Commission on Environmental Quality] authorization for a
landowner to exercise the rights the landowner possesses by virtue
of its ownership of the fee: the permits did not give EPS an owner-
ship interest in the formations below FPL’s property that are at is-
sue in this case. Additionally, the fact that EPS is using the deep
subsurface for commercial purposes indicates that the subsurface
levels at issue have economic potential for storing waste, which oth-
erwise, absent its safe storage, has the potential to adversely affect
the environment. Finally, the Legislature has not provided adjoining
landowners of tracts used to inject nonhazardous waste with a right
to pool their affected properties, allowing adjacent owners to obtain
revenue for the commercial storage value of their subsurface. Thus,
64. Id. at 309.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 310–15.
67. Id.
68. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 383 S.W.3d 274, 279–80 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.).
69. Id. at 281.
70. Id.
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without a trespass remedy, a party—in this case, a limited partner-
ship—does not have all of the legal remedies typically available to
owners to protect the owner’s right to the exclusive use of its
property.71
The court then concluded that Texas law recognizes FPL’s property
interest in the briny water underneath its property and that FPL has a
cause of action for subsurface trespass under common law against
EPS to protect its legal interest in the property.72
A few cases have also alleged trespass claims related to air contami-
nants.  For instance, in Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants’ natural gas exploration and development
activities close to her home caused emissions and discharges, which
exposed the plaintiffs and their property to hazardous gases.73  In
Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., the plaintiffs made similar tres-
pass claims related to air contaminants.74  With respect to these
claims, the court considered whether a trespass occurs when a thing
passes unwanted through the air above a person’s property.75  The
court noted the weight of authority from the other states favors that
this scenario is a nuisance, not a trespass.76  However, relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, the court held that if it is an
actionable trespass to “fly an advertising kite or balloon through the
air above [someone’s land],” then sending noxious chemicals their
way is a trespass too.77  On this basis, the court maintained the tres-
pass claim for the time being.78
C. Negligence and Negligence Per Se
Negligence and negligence per se claims are also typically alleged.
For instance, in Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that
carcinogenic and toxic chemicals used in the defendant’s hydraulic
fracturing operations were discharged into the ground or into the wa-
ters near the plaintiffs’ home and water well due to the defendant’s
negligent planning, training, and supervision of staff, employees, and/
or agents.79  The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendant failed to
disclose to the plaintiffs and to public authorities and/or agencies, ma-
terial facts concerning the nature, extent, magnitude, and effects of
71. Id. at 281–82.
72. Id. at 282.
73. Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. 11-01650-E (Cnty. Ct. at Law No. 5, Dallas
County, Tex. filed Mar. 8, 2011).
74. Tucker v. Sw.  Energy Co., Nos. 1:11-CV-0044, 1:11-CV-45-DPM, 2012 WL




78. Id. at *4.
79. Pl.’s Original Compl. at 1–3, 7–8, 12–11, Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC, No. 1:12-
CV-00614-DCN (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (No. 2).
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the contaminants emitted, released, stored, handled, processed, trans-
ported, and/or disposed of in and around the facility and surrounding
environment, specifically with regard to their effects on plaintiffs and
their property.80  On this basis, the plaintiffs claimed that the defen-
dant did not exercise reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs and their
property but rather were negligent.  As a direct, proximate, and rea-
sonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiffs
claimed they were exposed to toxic substances, toxic fumes, and/or
carcinogens.81  In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
was negligent per se for violating its duties under applicable state and
federal regulations intended to ensure the public safety from toxic ex-
posures, including the requirements of the Ohio Water Pollution Con-
trol Act.82
As in any negligence case, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached
the duty, and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury.83  In this regard, the plaintiff generally claims that the defendant
has a duty to conduct itself in a manner as to not contaminate the
plaintiff’s property.  However, the standard of care can be a moving
target as the appropriate standard of care will change with advance-
ments in technology and some pollution is an unavoidable part of ex-
ploration, production, transportation, and refining of oil and gas.  As
one commentator stated, “spills will occur, lines and tanks will leak,
and equipment upsets will happen because human action is
involved.”84
Related to negligence is the theory of negligence per se.  Negligence
per se is a concept in which a legislatively imposed standard of con-
duct is adopted by the civil courts as defining the conduct of a reason-
able and prudent person.85  In such a case, the jury is not asked to
decide whether the defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent person
would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.86  The stat-
ute itself states what a reasonable, prudent person would have done.87
If an excuse is not raised, the only inquiry for the jury is whether the
defendant violated the statute or regulation and, if so, whether the




83. Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009).
84. William R. Keffer, Drilling for Damages: Common Law Relief in Oilfield Pol-
lution Cases, 47 SMU L. Rev. 523, 527 (1994).
85. Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Carter v. Willliam Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d




2013] A SURVEY OF TYPICAL CLAIMS 317
Texas, Statewide Rule 8 could potentially serve as the basis for a negli-
gence per se claim related to oilfield contamination.89
D. Breach of Contract
Breach of contract claims usually relate to breach of a mineral lease
agreement between the mineral interest owner and the operator or
breach of a surface use agreement between the operator and the sur-
face estate owner.  Such agreements might contain clauses that re-
quire the operator to restore the property to pre-drilling condition
following operations.90  Contamination might be a breach of such
agreements as well as a breach of an implied covenant to manage and
administer the lease as a reasonably prudent operator.91  For instance,
in Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs claimed that the
gas leases required the operator to test the plaintiffs’ water supplies
following commencement of drilling operations in order to ensure that
the water supplies would not be adversely affected by its operations.92
In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the gas leases required the op-
erator to take all steps necessary to return the plaintiffs’ water sup-
plies to pre-drilling conditions.93  The plaintiffs also claimed that the
operator expressly warranted to the plaintiffs that their land would
remain safe and undisturbed despite its drilling activities.94
Note that in Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, LLC, the court
found that the plaintiff could not maintain a breach of contract action
against the defendants for their natural gas extraction activities on ad-
joining properties since the plaintiff had no current contractual rela-
tionship with the defendants and could not maintain a claim based
upon their former lease agreements.95  Since the breach of contract
claim was barred, the plaintiff’s claim of a breach of duty of good
faith, which was wholly dependent upon the existence of a contractual
relationship, also failed.96
E. Strict Liability
Plaintiffs have had mixed results in claiming that hydraulic fractur-
ing is an ultra-hazardous and abnormally dangerous activity for pur-
89. Id.
90. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 692 (La. 2003).
91. In re Exxon Mobil Prod. Co., 340 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2011, original proceeding).
92. Br. in Opp’n at 25–27, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-CV-
02284 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 19).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, LLC, 2012 WL 1463594, at *5–6 (M.D.
Pa. 2012).
96. Id.
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poses of strict liability.97  For instance, in Tucker v. Southwestern
Energy Co., the Arkansas court determined that the record lacked
sufficient information for it to determine whether hydraulic fracturing
is an ultra-hazardous activity.98  The court then followed two Penn-
sylvania cases, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.99 and Berish v.
Southwestern Energy Production Co.,100 and withheld such determina-
tion until a full record had been established at the summary-judgment
stage.101  Texas, on the other hand, does not recognize a cause of ac-
tion for strict liability for ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous
activities.102
F. Liability Under State Hazardous Sites Cleanup Acts
In Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs also asserted a
claim against the defendants pursuant to the Pennsylvania Hazardous
Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA).103  The plaintiffs claimed that at all rele-
vant times, the defendants owned and/or operated the sites, and/or the
defendants owned or possessed and arranged for the disposal, treat-
ment or transport for disposal or treatment of the hazardous sub-
stances, under the HSCA.104  The plaintiffs further claimed that the
defendants have caused, and continue to cause, releases or substantial
threats of releases, of hazardous substances or contaminants which
present a substantial danger to the public health or safety or the envi-
ronment, under HSCA.105  Pursuant to section 702 of the HSCA, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were strictly liable for costs in-
curred by the plaintiffs to respond to the defendants’ releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances and contaminants, in-
cluding but not limited to the cost of a health assessment or health
effects study, medical monitoring, and interest.106
G. Fraud
In Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendants failed to warn plaintiffs of the dangers of potential
97. See e.g., Pl.’s Original Compl. at 7, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No.
4:10-CV-00708 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1); Pl.’s Original Compl. at 10–11,
Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., 11-CV-0044 (E.D. Ark. filed May 17, 2011) (No. 1); Br. in
Opp’n at 25, Fiorentino, No. 3:09-CV-02284 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 19).
98. Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., 2012 WL 528253 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2012).
99. Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 511–12 (M.D. Pa.
2010).
100. Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
101. Tucker, 2012 WL 528253.
102. Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied).
103. Br. in Opp’n at 19, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 09-CV-2284
(M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 19).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 20.
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discharges into groundwater.107  The plaintiffs claimed that the de-
fendants’ failure to disclose amounted to fraud and that facts were
concealed knowingly and with reckless disregard to the plaintiffs’
health and well-being, which proximately caused the plaintiffs’ dam-
ages.  Similarly, in Harris v. Devon Energy Production Co., the plain-
tiffs claimed that the defendant failed to warn the plaintiffs of the
dangers of the hydraulic fracturing process and the chemicals used by
the defendant in its drilling operation near the plaintiffs’ home.108
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s failure to disclose
amounted to fraud, and facts were concealed knowingly and with
reckless disregard to the plaintiffs’ health and well-being, which proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs’ damages.109
However, a plaintiff must plead fraud with particularity and must
include “the time, place and contents of the false representations, as
well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and
what that person obtained thereby.”110  On this basis, several defend-
ants have been successful on motions to dismiss based upon the plain-
tiffs’ failure to plead their fraud claims with particularity.  For instance
in Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co. and Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC,
the courts granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss fraud claims be-
cause they were not pled with particularity.111
IV. TYPICAL DAMAGES
Plaintiffs seek various damages, including property damages, cost of
testing, loss of use of land, loss of market value of land, mental dam-
ages, exemplary damages, and injunctive relief.  Plaintiffs have also
sought damages for future medical monitoring.  For instance, in
Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., the plaintiffs sought the establish-
ment of a monitoring fund to pay for medical monitoring of the
named-plaintiffs and all others similarly situated for health effects
stemming from the defendants’ alleged use of harmful and hazardous
compounds.112  However, the plaintiffs’ ability to assert such claims
107. Br. for Pl. at 7, Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 3:10-CV-02555-
N (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
108. Pl.’s Original Compl. at 6–7, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 4:10-
CV-00708 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 1).
109. Id.
110. United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Grp., 193 F.3d 304, 308
(5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City
of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009); see United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/
HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997).
111. Order at 3, Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., No 1:11-CV-0044-DPM (E.D. Ark. May
17, 2011) (No. 82); Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00614 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
12, 2012); see also Order at 3, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 4:10-CV-
00708 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 13).
112. Pl.’s Original Compl. at 19, Tucker, No. 1:11-CV-0044-DPM (No. 1).
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varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For instance, medical monitor-
ing claims are permitted in Pennsylvania but not in Texas.113
Intentional infliction of emotional distress has also been alleged.
For instance, in Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant’s intentional actions proximately caused
the plaintiffs to suffer injuries, including but not limited to elevated
concern for health, elevated concern for safety, depression, and feel-
ings of helplessness.114  However, one court granted a motion to dis-
miss related to such a claim due to the plaintiff’s failure to plead or
prove manifestation of an injury.115  Another court acknowledged that
manifestation was a required element, but held off on dismissing the
claim until the case had developed further.116
Recently, in Magers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the defendant
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages on the
basis that they made no allegations of intentional conduct, which is
required to support such a claim.117  However, the court found that
the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendants refused to provide the plain-
tiffs with water or compensate them for the contamination of their
well water, which contamination the plaintiffs alleged occurred as a
result of the defendants’ drilling-related activities on adjoining prop-
erty, sufficiently raised the probability of the applicability of punitive
damages above mere speculation, which satisfied the requirements of
Rule 8 of Federal Procedure.118
V. KEY DEFENSES AND STRATEGIES
Several key defenses and strategies are available in response to
claims of alleged contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing activi-
ties.  For the most part, these are the same defenses that have histori-
cally been utilized in environmental pollution cases in Texas and
elsewhere, which are described below.
A. Surface Estate Owner and Neighboring Property Owner
The duties owed by an oil and gas operator to the surface estate
owner are much narrower than those owed to a neighboring property
owner.  When the mineral and surface estates are severed, the mineral
estate is the dominant estate.119  The execution of a mineral lease typi-
113. Compare Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512–13
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (finding the plaintiff had alleged the elements of a medical monitor-
ing claim) with Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
114. Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2012 WL 5336958 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).
115. Berish v. Sw. Energy Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
116. Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514–15 (M.D. Pa.
2010).
117. Magers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 1558647 (N.D. W. Va. Apr.
10, 2013).
118. Id.
119. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
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cally not only severs the minerals from the surface but also creates
dominant and servient estates.120  The entity that owns the minerals
enjoys the dominant estate.121  Ownership of the dominant estate car-
ries with it the right to enter and extract the minerals and “all other
such incidents thereto as are necessary to be used for getting and en-
joying” the minerals.122  Incident to the right to extract is the right to
explore.123  If in pursuing these rights, the servient estate is susceptible
to use in only one manner, then the owner of the dominant estate may
pursue that use irrespective of whether it results in damage to the sur-
face.124  In other words, if particular damage to the surface estate can-
not reasonably be avoided in legitimately pursuing the rights of the
dominant estate, the owner of the dominant estate is not liable for the
damage.125
Thus, the mere fact of damage to the surface does not evince unrea-
sonable conduct.126  Instead, it is incumbent upon the surface owner
to establish that the dominant estate owner failed to use reasonable
care in pursuing its rights or that the rights could have been pursued
through reasonable alternate means sufficient to achieve the goal de-
sired but without the damage.127  Accordingly, the servient estate
owner must prove that its opponent failed to act reasonably given the
correlative rights and liabilities involved.128  However, these same
standards are not applicable to neighboring property owners who also
claim that their property has been impacted by an oil and gas opera-
tor.  Accordingly, the status of the plaintiff could widely determine the
duties owed to him.
In Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the plaintiffs, the surface
estate owners, claimed that the defendant, Chesapeake, physically in-
truded and caused damage to the plaintiffs’ land by depositing drilling
waste and other material in pits on the plaintiffs’ property.129  The
defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it obtained
broad rights to use the property through the severance deed and lease,
and that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
120. H.B. Taylor v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., No. 07-00-0225-CV, 2002 WL 58423
at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
121. Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854
S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971).
125. Tarrant Cnty. Water Control, 854 S.W.2d at 911; Getty Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d at
622.
126. See Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980).
127. Tarrant Cnty. Water Control, 854 S.W.2d at 911.
128. Id.
129. Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2012 WL 5336958, at *2 (N.D. W. Va.
2012).
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(WVDEP) permit recognizes that its actions were reasonable and nec-
essary, and thus it did not commit a trespass.130
The court first noted that “[i]t is well settled in West Virginia that
one who owns subsurface rights to a parcel of property has the right to
use the surface of the land in such a manner and with such means as
would be fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the subsurface es-
tate.”131  In addition, the court recognized that Chesapeake’s decision
to fill the pits on the Teel’s property was an act contemplated by West
Virginia law.132  However, permits do not provide immunizations from
common law standards.133  Nonetheless, the court stated that the
WVDEP permits can, as they did in this case, serve to inform this
court of the practices of the oil and gas industry in West Virginia.134
The court then relied upon earlier precedent and held that the mere
fact that Chesapeake eventually migrated to a closed-loop system
does not render its prior use of pits unreasonable, especially given the
West Virginia law currently in place regulating the use of the pits.135
Accordingly, based upon West Virginia law and the facts in this case,
the court found that the plaintiffs’ trespass claim failed.136
Similarly, in Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the defendant
argued that under Pennsylvania law, it, as the owner of the dominant
mineral estate, had the right to burden the servient surface estate in
whatever manner reasonably necessary for the development of the
minerals.137  In a related case, an operator sought a declaratory judg-
ment that a lease granted it the right to use the surface for disposal of
waste water produced by hydraulic fracturing by virtue of its subsur-
face rights and that the company had in essence an implied easement
to do so.138  With respect to subsurface rights, the court held that pur-
suant to the deed the operator owned the rights to the oil and gas
associated with the subject property, but had no rights to the space
occupied once the oil and gas was depleted.139  With respect to surface
rights, the operator argued that it had an implied right to the reasona-
bly necessary use of the surface to utilize its disposal well.140  The




133. Id. at *6 (citing FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d
306, 310 (Tex. 2011)).
134. Id.
135. See Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D.N.D. 2012); Whiteman v.
Chesapeake, 873 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. W. Va. 2012).
136. Teel, 2012 WL 5336958, at *6.
137. Supp. Order at 12, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 09-CV-2284
(M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 346).
138. EXCO Res. (PA), LLC v. New Forestry, LLC, 2012 WL 3043008, at * 1 (M.D.
Pa. 2012).
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id. at *5.
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surface to take away the “subterranean minerals,” such implied right
did not extend to perpetual use of the surface for purposes other than
accessing those minerals.141  The court then granted summary judg-
ment against the operator with respect to its claims for declaratory
judgment.142
B. Causation
1. Lone Pine Orders
Perhaps one of the most successful techniques in keeping defense
costs down has been the entry of a Lone Pine order that requires the
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of exposure and causation
before full discovery is allowed.143  The first case to enter such an or-
der involving hydraulic fracturing was Strudley v. Antero Resources,
Corp.144  In that case, the court, cognizant of the significant discovery
and cost burdens presented by a case of this nature, endeavored to
invoke a more efficient procedure than that set out in the standard
case management order (MCMO).145  On this basis, the court re-
quired the plaintiffs, before full discovery and other procedures were
allowed, to make a prima facie showing of exposure and causation.146
The plaintiffs were given 105 days to comply with the MCMO.147  The
defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the plaintiffs failed to show how the alleged injuries were caused by
the defendants’ hydraulic fracturing operations.148  The court granted
the motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.149
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the fact that the Colo-
rado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) had con-
ducted an investigation of the plaintiffs’ well water and had concluded
that the water supply was not affected by oil and gas operations in the
vicinity.150  The court further considered the defendants’ sworn testi-
mony that their activities were conducted in compliance with applica-
ble laws and regulations designed to protect human health and the
environment, including those administered by the COGCC and the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment.151  In addi-
tion, the court considered evidence that the defendants’ air emission-
141. Id. at *6.
142. Id. at *9.
143. See Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 635707 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 18, 1986).
144. Strudley v. Antero Res., Corp., 2012 WL 1932470 (Colo. D. Ct., Denver Cnty.
May 9, 2012).
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control equipment at the wells and prevailing wind patterns made it
unlikely that the plaintiffs or their property were exposed to harmful
levels of chemicals from the defendants’ activities.152
The court further noted that the plaintiffs’ sole expert, Dr. Kurt,
was apparently not willing to go beyond a temporal connection be-
tween the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and the defendants’ drilling activi-
ties.153  These missing links in the chain of causation were exactly what
the court sought to remedy through the MCMO.154  As discussed
above, the MCMO was entered in an effort to determine whether the
plaintiff could produce admissible evidence concerning exposure and
causation.155  Despite this, Dr. Kurt was willing to represent only that
environmental exposure and health information existed to warrant
further substantive discovery.156  Dr. Kurt did not opine on whether
any of the substances present in the air and water samples can cause
the type(s) of disease or illness that the plaintiff claimed (general
causation).157
The court further stated that Dr. Kurt did not discuss the dose or
other quantitative measurement of the concentration, such as the tim-
ing and duration of each plaintiff’s exposure to each substance.158  Dr.
Kurt failed to address whether there was any exposure at some precise
location in addition to the plaintiffs’ residence.159  He further ne-
glected to provide an identification, by way of reference to a medically
recognized diagnosis, of the specific disease or illness from which each
plaintiff allegedly suffered or for which medical monitoring was pur-
portedly necessary.160  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Dr.
Kurt did not even attempt to draw a conclusion that the plaintiff’s
alleged injuries or illnesses were in fact caused by such exposure (spe-
cific causation).161
However, on July 3, 2013, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal and held that the Lone Pine order prevented the plain-
tiffs from proving their claims and was not necessary to protect against
frivolous claims or unreasonably burdensome discovery.162  The court
reasoned that circumstances surrounding the case were not shown to
be so extraordinary as to require departure from the existing rules of
civil procedure.163  Further, the court stated that by entering the or-
152. Id.









162. See Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., 2013 WL 3427901, at *18, No. 12 CA 1251
(Col. Ct. App. July 3, 2013).
163. Id. at *28.
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der, the trial court unduly interfered with the plaintiffs’ opportunity to
prove their claims against the companies.164
Nonetheless, since the underlying Strudley decision, several cases
have similarly sought to enter a Lone Pine order early in the litigation.
The results have varied.  For instance, in Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC,
the court, similar to the court in Strudley, granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to modify the case management order requiring the plaintiffs to
produce evidence sufficient to show prima facie elements of exposure,
injury, and causation prior to further discovery or other proceedings
in the case.165  In addition, based upon the pleadings, it appears that
the plaintiff consented to the entry of such order in Teekell v. Chesa-
peake Operating, Inc.166
However, the court denied the defendants’ request in Roth v. Cabot
Oil & Gas Corp.167  In that case, the defendants based their argument
primarily on the fact that the plaintiffs’ counsel had been engaged in a
related lawsuit for more than two years and had in fact been repre-
senting the plaintiffs since 2011, prior to bringing this lawsuit.168  The
defendants argued that the counsel’s longstanding involvement in re-
lated litigation, negotiations with the defendants’ counsel even before
this litigation was filed, and the content of the defendants’ voluminous
initial disclosures should be sufficient to give the plaintiffs the infor-
mation they would need to establish a prima facie case, if they were in
fact able to do so.169
The plaintiffs argued that this case was not well-suited for a Lone
Pine case-management order.170  Plaintiffs contended that, where they
have been issued, Lone Pine orders have been focused on toxic tort
cases involving personal injury and medical causation. Since there
were no medical claims stated in the amended complaint, the plaintiffs
suggested that a Lone Pine order was no longer appropriate based
upon the subject matter of the litigation alone.171
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the claims pleaded in this
case related to gas and oil drilling activities located less than 1,000 feet
from the plaintiffs’ property and groundwater supply, and that the
DEP actually documented defects in the gas wells and instances of
contamination releases or spills, which were incorporated as part of
164. Id.
165. Order at 1–3, Boggs v. Landmark 4 LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00614 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
12, 2012) (No. 18).
166. Teekell v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 555,703 (La. Dist. Ct., Caddo Par-
ish, Dec. 6, 2011), removed, Order at 1–2, No. 5:12-CV-00044 (W.D. La., Jan. 12,
2012) (No. 30).
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the amended complaint.172  The plaintiffs suggested that this evidence
alone supported the plaintiffs’ prima facie case that the defendants’
operations contaminated the plaintiffs’ groundwater.173
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the claims in this case were
straightforward and familiar property-related tort claims, which were
neither doubtful nor implausible.174  The plaintiffs thus maintained
that the claims stated in the amended complaint were easily distin-
guishable from claims of medical injury in mass tort litigation that may
be predicated upon questionable and unsubstantiated claims of causa-
tion, which were more typically subjected to Lone Pine case-manage-
ment orders.175
The court agreed with the plaintiffs and denied the defendants’ mo-
tion, stating, “Resorting to and crafting a Lone Pine order should only
occur where existing procedural devices explicitly at the disposal of
the parties by statute and federal rule have been exhausted or where
they cannot accommodate the unique issues of this litigation. We have
not reached that point.”176  Similarly, in Kamuck v. Shell Energy
Holdings GP, LLC, the court found that although it has the authority
to enter a Lone Pine order in the exercise of its broad discretion to
manage a civil action, it was not persuaded that such an order was
warranted at that time.177  Accordingly, it denied the defendants’ mo-
tion, but did so without prejudice to the defendants seeking to return
to the court if they believed in good faith that the plaintiff’s discovery
requests were unreasonably burdensome in light of the relative gener-
ality of the plaintiff’s allegations regarding his injuries and the defend-
ants’ allegedly tortious conduct.178
2. State Action Levels
In addition, plaintiffs might not be able to prove causation if con-
taminants are not present in concentrations above certain levels.  In
Taco Cabana Inc. v. Exxon Corp., the purchaser of commercial prop-
erty sued the former lessee of the prior owner for trespass, negligence
per se, and other claims, alleging that the lessee failed to remediate
the property it previously subleased as a gasoline station.179  The San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to establish
causation, as the evidence did not establish that the soil contained






177. Order at 16–17, Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, LLC, No. 4:11-CV-
01425 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2011) (No. 52).
178. Id.
179. Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 5 S.W.3d 773, 779–80 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
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duty to take corrective action.180  The court reasoned that “[t]o the
extent that any common law duties regarding removal of contamina-
tion existed, such duties ha[d] been displaced by the Texas Water
Code . . . because the Legislature ha[d] delegated to the TWC the task
of determining appropriate cleanup standards.”181
Based upon similar reasoning, in Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy
Corp., the defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims because test results were be-
low Texas’s safe drinking water levels.182  In addition, in Harris v.
Devon Energy Production Co., even though testing showed toxic con-
tamination in the plaintiffs’ well water when the lawsuit was filed in
December 2010, more recent testing showed that the contamination
was no longer at a toxic level for human consumption.  Accordingly,
the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their claims without
prejudice.183
3. No Evidence
With respect to water pollution claims, plaintiffs are required to
show that contaminants from defendants’ hydraulic fracturing activi-
ties migrated into plaintiffs’ water wells and caused their injuries.184
“Causation cannot be established by mere guess or conjecture; it must
be established by evidence of probative value.”185  In Mitchell Energy
Corp. v. Bartlett, the plaintiff relied on testimony from a geochemist
that specialized in “isotopic geochemistry” to establish that the con-
taminants in the plaintiff’s water wells came from the defendants’ oil
and gas operations.186  However, the court held that the geochemist’s
testimony provided no evidence of causation in light of fact that the
expert did not gather any evidence from other gas wells in the area
and did not rule out other possibilities of the alleged contamination.187
In FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that the plain-
tiff suffered any injury caused by the defendant’s injections of waste
into a wastewater injection well on its property, as there was no evi-
180. Id. at 780.
181. Id.
182. Mot. Summ. J. at 25–26, Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 3:10-CV-
01385 (N.D. Tex., July 15, 2010) (No. 44).
183. Order, Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 4:10-CV-00708 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 56).
184. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1997, pet. denied) (citing Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731
(Tex. 1984)).
185. Id. (citing McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.
1980)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 446–47.
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dence that the wastewater had migrated to the surface of the property
or that the injection well was a danger to the drinking water.188
Similarly, in Hagy v. Equitable Production Co., the court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which asserted there
was no evidence of causation for negligence, trespass, and nuisance
claims.189  In Harris v. Devon Energy Production Co., the defendant
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs’ claim that
their water well was contaminated as a result of the defendant’s drill-
ing, fracking, and storage activities was not scientifically possible.190
Finally, in Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Arkansas) Inc., defen-
dant Deep Six Water Disposal Services, LLC, filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis that, to date, the plaintiffs had not
produced any proof of a causal relationship between the operation of
the injection wells and seismic events, which the plaintiffs claimed
were the source of their damages.191
4. Collateral Attack
In Lipsky v. Range Production Co., the defendant operator success-
fully argued that a finding by the Texas Railroad Commission that it
was not the cause of alleged contamination collaterally barred the
plaintiffs’ subsequent civil claims.192  Range drilled two natural gas
wells in 2009 near the Lipskys’ property.193  According to the Lipskys,
in the latter part of 2009, they began noticing problems with their
water.194  The Lipskys contacted public health officials, who referred
them to an environmental consultant, Alisa Rich.195  After the Lip-
skys contracted in August 2010 with Rich and her company, Wolf Ea-
gle Environmental, to conduct testing, she confirmed the presence of
various gases in the Lipskys’ water well.196
In December 2010, after being notified by Rich and the Lipskys
about the circumstances at the Lipskys’ property and after conducting
its own investigation, the EPA issued an emergency order stating that
Range’s production activities had caused or contributed to the gas in
the Lipskys’ water well and that the gas could be hazardous to the
188. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2009), rev’d, 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011).
189. Hagy v. Equitable Prod. Co., No. 10-C-163 (Cir. Ct., Jackson Cnty., W. Va.
Oct. 26, 2010).
190. Mot., Harris v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 4:10-CV-00708 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 36).
191. Mot. Summ. J., Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-CV-
0474 (E.D. Ark. May 24, 2011) (No. 62).
192. Lipsky v. Range Prod. Co., No. CV-11-0798 (43rd Dist. Ct., Parker Cnty, Tex.
filed June 20, 2011).





2013] A SURVEY OF TYPICAL CLAIMS 329
Lipskys’ health.197  In the order, the EPA required Range to, among
other actions, provide potable water to the Lipskys and install ex-
plosivity meters at the Lipskys’ property.198  The federal government,
acting at the request of the EPA, later filed a lawsuit in federal district
court against Range, alleging that Range had not complied with re-
quirements of the emergency order.199
The Texas Railroad Commission also investigated the contamina-
tion of the Lipskys’ well.200  After calling a hearing and listening to
testimony from several witnesses in January 2011, the Railroad Com-
mission issued a unanimous decision in March 2011 that Range had
not contaminated the Lipskys’ water.201
Despite this finding, on June 20, 2011, the Lipskys filed suit against
several defendants, including Range, for claims related to alleged con-
tamination of their water well that, according to the Lipskys, resulted
from Range’s “oil and gas drilling activities.”202  In their original peti-
tion, the Lipskys claimed that the contamination had caused a water
pump to malfunction and had caused the water “to be flammable.”203
Against Range, the Lipskys sought compensatory and punitive dam-
ages while asserting causes of action for negligence, gross negligence,
and private nuisance.204  The Lipskys alleged that Range’s drilling, in-
cluding hydraulic fracture stimulation operations, affected their water
source, and they contended that they could no longer use their home
as a residence.205
On August 18, 2011, Range filed a plea to the jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the
plaintiffs’ nuisance and trespass claims were an impermissible collat-
eral attack on the Texas Railroad Commission’s Final Order that
found that Range’s operations “ha[d] not caused or contributed, and
[were] not causing or contributing to contamination of any domestic
water wells.”  Range argued that the Lipskys were required to appeal
the Railroad Commission’s decision in Range’s favor by filing suit in a
Travis County district court.  The trial court agreed and granted
Range’s motion on January 27, 2012.
It should be noted that a month after the Lipskys sued Range,
Range answered the suit and brought counterclaims (against the Lip-
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and abetting, defamation, and business disparagement.206  Range con-
tended, among other arguments, that Range’s fracking of a deep shale
formation could not have contaminated the Lipskys’ much shallower
water well; that Range’s two gas wells near the Lipskys’ residence had
“mechanical integrity”; that other factors occurring before Range’s
drilling contributed to gas in the Lipskys’ well; that the Railroad Com-
mission had already found that Range’s drilling did not contaminate
the Lipskys’ well; that the contrary conclusion that had been reached
by the EPA was based on incomplete and overlooked data; that the
Lipskys had ignored the Railroad Commission’s findings by continu-
ing to blame Range for the contamination; that Rich, along with the
Lipskys, had, with malice against Range, made false, misleading, and
disparaging statements; and that Range’s business reputation had
therefore suffered.207
The Lipskys and Rich each answered Range’s claims and filed mo-
tions to dismiss under Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, also known as the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act,
which is considered to be anti-SLAPP legislation.208  The trial court
denied the motions to dismiss, for which the Lipskys and Rich sought
a writ of mandamus.209  The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that
the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing the claims against
Mrs. Lipsky and Alisa Rich; however, the court permitted Range Re-
sources to pursue its claims against Mr. Lipsky for defamation and
business disparagement.210
C. Temporary and Permanent Injury
“The difference between temporary and permanent injury is signifi-
cant, primarily as it relates to” the appropriate measure of damages as
well as the “affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.”211
1. Measure of Damages
Permanent damage results from activity that is of such a character
and that exists under such circumstances “that it will be presumed to
continue indefinitely.”212  Permanent injuries are those that are “con-
stant and continuous, not intermittent or recurrent.”213  The proper
measure of damages for permanent injury to the land is the diminu-
206. In re Lipsky, 2013 WL 1715459, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, original
proceeding).
207. Id.
208. Id. at *1 (SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation).
209. Id.
210. Id. at *17.
211. Id.
212. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tex. 2004) (citing
Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984)).
213. Id.
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tion in the value of the land.214  Temporary injuries are intermittent,
sporadic, or recurrent injuries to land that are “contingent upon some
irregular force, such as rain.”215  When an injury to land is temporary
and can be remediated at reasonable expense, the proper measure of
damages is the cost of restoration to its condition immediately preced-
ing the injury.216  However, when the cost of restoration exceeds the
diminution in fair market value, the diminution in fair market value is
the cap on the measure of damages.217
This argument was made by the defendants in Teel v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC.218  However, the defendants’ argument was denied
as moot because the court found that the plaintiffs’ trespass claim
failed, and the plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of all other remain-
ing claims. Thus, damages were no longer at issue.
2. Statute of Limitations
Trespass, nuisance, and negligence for damages to land are gov-
erned by the two-year statute of limitations and are required to be
brought within two years from the date of accrual.219  “An action for
permanent damages to land accrues, for limitations purposes, upon
the date of discovery of the first actionable injury”—not on the date
the damages to the land are fully ascertainable.220  Thus, an action to
recover damages for permanent injury accrues when injury first occurs
or is discovered.  On the other hand, a temporary injury claim accrues
anew upon each injury.221  Accrual of limitations is a question of law
for the court.222  In Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., the defend-
ants argued that under Texas law the continuing tort doctrine, which is
an exception to the statute of limitations, does not apply to claims
where the damages arise from permanent injury to the land.223
214. Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1978).
215. Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1978).
216. Kraft, 565 S.W.2d at 227.
217. N. Ridge Corp. v. Walraven, 957 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1997,
pet. denied) (citing Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Texarkana 1974), aff’d, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975)).
218. Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2012 WL 5336958, at *8 n.5 (N.D. W.
Va. 2012).
219. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 2012 & Supp.);
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997,
pet. denied).
220. Corley v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 821 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 437–38.
223. Mot. Summ. J. at 18, Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 3:10-CV-01385
(N.D. Tex. July 15, 2010) (No. 44).
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3. Application
Texas courts have generally considered contamination from oil and
gas operations to be permanent injuries to the land.  For instance, in
Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc., the Houston Court of Appeals held that the
damage to property caused by discharge of drilling fluids, diesel fuel,
oil, and saltwater during operations at oil and gas wells was perma-
nent.224  In Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co., the same court determined
that landowners could sue an oil and gas company for permanent
damages to their property based upon gas leaks and the disposal of
brine, which began several years earlier.225  In Walton v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Co., the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a landowner al-
leged permanent injuries by asserting that an oil company’s salt-water
pits caused migration of pollutants into his groundwater. At the time,
the landowner’s water was contaminated and had been for several
years, and there was never a time where contamination was non-exis-
tent or significantly diminished due to changing conditions.226  Finally,
in Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
determined that the injuries to the landowners’ property were perma-
nent based upon claims of groundwater contamination from the de-
fendant’s historic oil and gas operations.227
D. Standing
Only the person whose primary legal right has been breached has
standing to seek redress for an injury.228  In other words, a person has
standing to sue only when he or she is personally aggrieved by an
alleged wrong.229  “Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a
plaintiff, that plaintiff has no standing to litigate.”230  A plaintiff must
have a cause of action for injury to the property in order to have
standing.231  The cause of action for an injury to property belongs to
the person owning the property at the time of the injury.232  Without
224. Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 296, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
225. Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co., 814 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
226. Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 274 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2001, pet. denied), abrogated on other grounds by In re Estate of Swanson, 130 S.W.3d
144 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.).
227. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1997, pet. denied).
228. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976).
229. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.
1996).
230. Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, no pet.); Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001,
no pet.).
231. Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 732; see Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 927.
232. Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1980, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
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an express assignment, the cause of action does not pass to a subse-
quent purchaser of the property; thus, he or she cannot recover for an
injury committed before his or her purchase.233
In Senn v. Texaco, Inc., the Eastland Court of Appeals regarded
“the distinction between temporary and permanent injuries [a]s mean-
ingless with respect to the issue of standing.”234  The court held that
“any injury to the land that the defendants might have caused,
whether temporary or permanent, occurred prior to the plaintiffs’
purchase of the land,” and the plaintiffs, therefore, “d[id] not own any
causes of action for either type of injury that may have been caused by
the defendants.”235  Adopting the reasoning of the Eastland Court of
Appeals decision in Senn, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that, when
the undisputed evidence “showed a continuing condition that already
existed on the date of purchase,” and no new injuries occurred after
purchase of the property (or an assignment of a cause of action for the
prior injury), “the [plaintiff] had not been aggrieved and therefore had
no standing.”236
In West v. Brenntag Southwest, Inc., the court ruled that it had to
determine whether there was evidence of a new and distinct injury
that occurred after the plaintiff acquired the property.237  The plaintiff
argued that the contamination’s gradual leaking into the soil contin-
ued while he owned the property and that this fact was sufficient to
show a new injury to support standing.238  The court disagreed, hold-
ing that the fact that the injury existed throughout the plaintiff’s own-
ership did not create a new injury to the land.239  The court found that
the injury was continuous and lingering and, without an assignment,
would not support standing to bring suit for negligence or nuisance.240
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the size of the potential oil and natural gas reserves availa-
ble, shale gas development utilizing hydraulic fracturing provides this
nation with a realistic opportunity to finally reduce its dependence on
foreign oil.  However, to meet this nation’s future demands, the scale
of exploration and production will have to drastically increase over
the coming years. Such activities will undoubtedly lead to increased
environmental litigation.
233. Id.
234. Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet.
denied).
235. Id.
236. Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, pet. denied).
237. West v. Brenntag Sw., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 327, 332–33 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2005, pet. denied).
238. Id. at 335.
239. Id. at 335–36.
240. Id.
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As referenced above, most of the recent cases are still in their early
stages.  However, there is a developing body of law for practitioners
to follow.  To date, the oil and gas operators have successfully asserted
several key defenses that limited or dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in their
entirety.  The success of these defenses is highly dependent on the ju-
risdiction.  Perhaps the defense bar has been most successful at attack-
ing causation, and it should be noted that to date no judge or jury has
found that contamination was caused by hydraulic fracturing.  Of
course, this fact could change depending on the outcome of EPA’s
congressionally directed study of the risks to drinking water posed by
hydraulic fracturing, which is slated for completion in 2014.  With
time, novel claims and new defenses will undoubtedly arise as the liti-
gation matures and continues.
This paper was prepared in April 2013 as a general discussion of the
issues presented and is not to serve as, or to be relied upon as, legal
advice.  This paper would not have been completed without the assistance
of Erika Erikson, my colleague at Guida, Slavich & Flores, P.C.  The
views expressed in the paper are mine, and not of my law firm or its
clients.
